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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Several key points are made in this study:
§

A decisive move toward Montenegrin independence in the
near term will result in a war between Serbian and
Montenegrin forces.

§

A move toward Montenegrin independence would cause
Serbian public opinion to focus inward and would likely be
the first step in the process towards true democratic
evolution.

§

Russia is not likely to support Montenegrin independence.

§

Russia is unlikely to take decisive action to save the Yugoslav
Federatio n.
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INTRODUCTION

S

erbia and Montenegro each, with the help of Russian arms
and through the Treaty of Berlin, July 13, 1778, were

recognized as independent from the Ottoman Empire. The early
20th century saw the Serbian government ignite the fuse that
sparked the Great War and its progeny, the fall of the great
multinational empires, worldwide depression, World War II,
and the Cold War. From the carnage of the Great War,
representatives of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Montenegro
announced the creation of a new South Slav confederation,
Yugoslavia, under the ruling Serbian dynasty. The history of this
federation was troubled and violent with the Serbs attempting to
create a centralized Serb state and the other nationalities
resisting this effort in an attempt to maintain some degree of
autonomy.
The

Post

Cold

War

period

has

witnessed

both

globalization and a revival of nationalism by oppressed peoples.
The breakup of the Soviet Union and the fragmentation of
Yugoslavia are two of the more dramatic examples of these
phenomena.

The

policies

of

the

Yugoslavian

(Serbian)

government under Slobodan Milosevic have only exacerbated
and accelerated nationalistic tensions. The 20th century, which
began with such promise for Serbia, has ended in failure and
frustration. During the 1990s, Serbian power has been serially
excluded from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia

and

Kosovo. All that is left outside Serbia proper is the Voivodina
and Montenegro. And Serbia continues to try to hold on to what
remains using the same failed policies that have proved so
counterproductive in the past.
If Montenegro goes the way of the other republics, the
idea of Yugoslavia is a dead letter. Serbia will lose her access to
the sea. Therefore, Serbian policy and the ability to salvage
something from the current series of debacles are extremely
important issues for the peace and stability of the Balkans and
Eastern Europe. And crucial in all this is the policy of the
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Russian Federation towards Serbia and the Balkans and
Montenegro in particular. It is the Russians who have shown an
affinity to aid their South Slav cousins from the Tsarist Empire,
through the Soviet Union, even onto Boris Yeltsin’s Russian
Federation.
The principal author looks at the Montenegrin question
from an East-European perspective in the wake of Western
opposition to ethnic cleansing and other distasteful practices,
examining the ideas of Yugoslavian unity, the notion of a
Greater

Serbia,

and the possibility

and

implications

of

Montenegrin independence. Crucial to the outcome is the extent
to which Russia will come to the aid of Serbian policies. This
question is addressed and possible outcomes discussed below.
Many Montenegrins do not want independence but
pledge allegiance to Greater Serbia and will support Milosevic.
The Serbian refugees from Kosovo and Bosnia, some 32,000 of
whom are currently living in Montenegro, will also oppose
secession.
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STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF MONTENEGRO

M

ontenegro has never before enjoyed the international
importance it currently commands. The Montenegrin

leadership is shuttling to Western capitals where it is assured of
increased

support, Western strategic

analysts focus their

attention on the country, and NATO officers fill their folders
with detailed maps and aerial photos of the region. There is a
simple explanation for the sudden international prominence that
this small region now enjoys: Montenegro is the final element of
the Yugoslav

federation

outside

of Serbia.

Montenegrin

independence would end of the dream of a nation of southern
Slavs and, as some optimists predict, the beginning of a
democratic Serbia, an event which might bring a long awaited
stability to the Balkans. A Western-oriented Montenegro would
firmly isolate Serbia and Milosevic, make the economic blockade
work and bring an end to the Milosevic regime. However, the
mountainous republic may have to pay too a high price for its
independence. Strategists fear that “Montenegro will all too
likely be the next war in the series that have pockmarked the
death of the fantasy of Greater Serbia”. 1
Indeed, the little Adriatic country of 650,000 inhabitants
and 13,812 square kilometers, the size of US state of Connecticut,
with

no important

mineral

resources,

and no strategic

infrastructure has never before enjoyed such international
prominence. It has been an isolated borderland that even the
Turks were unable to control, paying little attention to the
remote mountainous theocracy after the conquest of Serbia in
1389. In 1918, after more then five centuries

of semi-

independence , Serbian King Alexander Karadjordjevic, a son-inlaw of Montenegrin King Nikola, backed by the Treaty of
Versailles, incorporated Montenegro into the newly established
kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, treating the inhabitants
of Montenegro as Serbs. During this period, all symbols or
1

SMITH Dan, “Integrating Serbia into the Balkan region”, Security Dialog Vol 30(3),
PRIO, SAGE publications, 1999.
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reminders of Montenegrin sovereignty were suppressed. Even
the traditional Montenegrin hat which displayed the Cyrillic
initials of King Nikola was banned and a new Serbian symbol
was required to be worn atop formal hats.
In 1945 Tito granted federal status to allied Montenegro
to increase the voting power of Belgrade in the eight-man
collective

leadership

of the

newly

established

Yugoslav

federation, relying on Montenegrins as the most loyal allies of
Serbia. In this period, vestiges of the old monarchy were
suppressed and Montenegrins seemed to accept their place in
the

Yugoslav

federation.

Apparently

loyal

to

the

end,

Montenegro was the only part of Yugoslavia that voted in the
1992 referendum to stay in federation.
The symbolic
Nikola Bacevic wearing
traditional costume and hat.

role of Montenegro

assumed

great

importance over the years. The only Balkan military force not
defeated by the Turks, it was seen by many as a beacon in their
fight for independence. The Russians regarded Montenegro as
the first free Slavic nation in the Balkans and their natural ally,
while the Serbians saw Montenegro as the beginning of the
Serbian independence and the cornerstone of Greater Serbia. The
rocky highlands of Montenegro (Crna Gora), with their nucleus
on the Zeta River, served as an important refuge to Serbs fleeing
from the advancing Turks in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries. Montenegro resisted as a semi-autonomous theocracy
for three centuries before becoming fully independent at the end
of the eighteenth century. 2
According to the 1991 census, the current inhabitants of
Montenegro identify themselves 62% as Montenegrins, 9% as
Serbs, 7% as Albanians, 15% as Muslims and 7% as others. Many
Montenegrins regard themselves as Serbs just as the Bavarians

An enlargement of the picture
showing the King's initials.

regard themselves as Germans. Others support the creation of a
separate Montenegrin nation, a separate state and a separate
church. While the majority of the population belongs to the
Orthodox Christian tradition (Montenegrins and Serbs), there is
also a large Muslim populati on and smaller numbers of Roman
Catholics.
2

G.W. Hoffman: “The Balkans in Transition”, D. Van Nostrand Company. New Jersey,
1963, p.40.
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The geography of Montenegro is dominated by two high
mountain ranges going across the country. The Montenegrin
seacoast is a narrow strip of land running from Kotor bay near
Croatia to the Bojana River at the frontier with Albania. The high
Dinaric mountains of Orjen, Lovcen and Rimija rise from the sea,
forming a magnificent background to the coastal strip but a great
obstacle to communication between the coastal and inland parts
of Montenegro. The old capital of Montenegro —Cetinje, is
hidden high on the mountain of Lovcen. The Zeta plain
bordering lake Skadar comprises the biggest lowland region of
Montenegro and the most fertile area. It is dominated by the
economic

and political

center

of Montenegro —Podgorica

(former Titograd), the country capital accounting for 130.000
inhabitants. The second range of high mountains, composed of
Durmitor, Komovi and Sinjajevina, separates the center of the
country from the northern plateau of Sandjak. Historically, it
was the Ottoman province of Sandjak that cut apart for long time
Montenegro and Serbia and prevented their earlier unification.
Divided between two republics in 1945, it remains home for
much of the region's dispersed Muslim population.
Montenegro traces its identity from one of the first
kingdoms in the Balkans called Duklja (independent since 1077),
later Zeta and finally Montenegro . In the 12th century the
principality became a battlefield between the Catholic and
Orthodox missionaries under the Croatian and Serbian (called
Raska at that time) influences. In 1186 Raska conquered Duklja
and its inhabitants converted to Orthodoxy. Since 1455, when
Serbia was defeated at Kosovo Polje, Zeta resisted the Turkish
penetration. While the Serbian church was subordinated to the
Turkish

Patriarchy

Autocephalic

Church

of

Constantinople,

functioned

the

Montenegrin

independently

and

was

recognized by the Russian Synod and the Eastern Pope of
Constantinople. Its elected leader, the Vladyka, became the
supreme authority of the theocracy. Cetinje, the Montenegrin
capital since 1482 and the mountain Lovcen today are symbols of
the highlanders’ ethic of honesty, courage and loyalty to their
country. The Berlin Congress of 1878 formally recognized the
independence of Montenegro and for 40 years Cetinje, one of the
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smallest European capitals was the host of many foreign
embassies (notably the Austrian, French, Russian, British and
Italian). 3
The continuing fragmentation of Yugoslavian federation
and the wave of changes in the region since the fall of the Iron
Curtain placed Montenegro in a completely new geopolitical
environment. Montenegro suddenly found itself bordered by
five political entities, namely Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
(exclusively Republica Srbska), Serbia proper, Kosovo and
Albania. If before Montenegro was simply an isolated seaside
resort on the Yugoslav Adriatic coastline, today it may provide
for critical transportation links between Croatia and Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. There are calls to begin using
Montenegro’s port of Bar to help supply aid to Kosovo. 4
Recently Montenegro has opened customs offices on Albanian
and Croatian borders, however it still has unresolved a dispute
with Croatia over the possession of Prevlaka half-island in
Southern Croatia. This strategic peninsula controls the entrance
to Kotor Bay and it is currently under observation by the UN
military observer mission (UNMOP). 5
While visiting the region this spring, Octavian Sofransky
observed that, for, Serbians Montenegro represents not only a
critical route to the sea through the ports of Bar and Kotor, but
also a physical expression of the idea of Yugoslavia unity.
Montenegrins regard Serbia as their most significant economic
partner and a long-standing ally but they also view it as
something of an albatross. They complain that as long as
Belgrade is a pariah in Western eyes, isolated politically and
economically, Montenegro has to bear the same “yoke.”
Today, along with all the countries in the Southeastern
Europe, Montenegro is going through a painful economic and
political transition. Ten years after the end of the Cold War it
became clear that the majority of the states in the region have
opted for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, a path that
guarantees a long-term stability and a clear prospective of
3

For more information see The Montenegrin Association of America Home Page.
“The next Balkan Crisis” – The New York Times – Editorial, posted April 21,2000
through www.montenegro.com .
4
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economic development. All of these countries, but Yugoslavia,
have in one form or another engaged in the integration process
with the European Union and NATO. The most advanced
candidates, such as Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria, have
opened negotiations for a full membership in the European
Union. They are also the forerunners for NATO membership.
Countries like Albania, Macedonia and, since recently, Croatia
are members of the Partnership for Peace program sponsored by
NATO. Even Yugoslavia, should it not too sound droll, through
its foreign minister, has unveiled its strategic goal to become
part of the European Union. 6
What one observes in the Balkans today is a complex
process

of integration

that proceeds

at various

speeds.

Throughout the region, both university scholars and government
officials speak of the urgency of creating a more effective
regional framework. Recognition of the need for a more
concerted, balanced, regional approach in cooperation was
demonstrated by the creation of the Stability pact for Southeastern Europe in 1999. The crucial significance

of this

agreement is that through its concluding Cooperation and
Association agreements, it offers the prospect, though a remote
one, of membership in the European Union for all the countries
in the region. Macedonia was first to benefit from this status, and
Croatia and Albania are following in line.
The notorious exception to this integration process is the
politically and economically isolated and authoritarian Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, within which Montenegrins increasingly
voice their dissatisfaction. Given its isolationist past and an
affinity to Serbia few can predict the future of Montenegro.
Several options appear plausible.

The first envisions

an

independent Montenegro, coming out of a non-violent divorce
with Serbia, as one of prosperous Adriatic mini-states, living on
tourism and commerce from a larger Europe. The second scenario
sees Montenegro as still a part of Yugoslavia, provided a
democratic transitio n takes place, as an equal part of a
5

CIA Home Page.
VUKOVIC Borislav, “Yugoslavi a and the European Union”, Review of International
Affairs, 1999.
6
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confederation. The third scenario predicts a violent break-up
with

Serbia,

transforming

Montenegro

into

a

NATO

protectorate, similar to Kosovo or Bosnia-Herzegovina, living on
donations from the international community. Indeed, the crucial
question

asked

by

international

community

and

the

Montenegrins themselves today is how to avoid violence and to
reach towards the European and world community at the same
time.

12
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INTERNAL POLITICAL DUALISM

T

he bicephalous Montenegri n eagle reflects perfectly the
dilemma of the country today. One head is looking to

Brussels and the West and the other remains loyal to Belgrade.
Since the 1999 crisis in Kosovo, the Montenegrin polity is
crystallizing around the two options: independence or a
continued federation. As in 1918, when the local assembly voted
the unification with Serbia, the Montenegrin patriots under the
green flag confront the Yugoslav patriots under the white.
The Green camp is growing constantly. Traditionally
supported by the nationalist wing, the Diaspora, and the

Montenegrin coat of arms

Montenegrin Autocephalous Orthodox Church, for the last two
years it has attracted on its orbit more and more moderate
parties and voters. The incumbent president, Milo Djukanovic,
has lately emerged as a leader of the Montenegro drive for
sovereignty against Belgrade autocratic rule.
The electoral block headed by Milo Djukanovic, “Da
Zivimo Bolje,” won the 1998 parliamentary elections with 49,54%
of the votes over the pro-Serbian Serbian National Party (SNP
which received 36,1% of the vote. The three parties of the
coalition —Social Democrat party (SDP) of Zarko Rackevic, the
People’s Party (NS) of Dragan Soc and Djukanovic’s Democratic
Socialist Party (DPS), have advanced a common “Platform,”
where they call Belgrade to accept confederate relations,
stopping short from independence.
Djukanovic, the president of Montenegro since the 1997
elections and a former Prime Minister, is an aparatchik.
However, since becoming president he has sharply criticized
Milosevic for his confrontation with the West, and has enacted
liberal

reforms,

launching

a

program

of

privatization,

introducing the Deutsche Mark as the second currency in the
country, and seeking cooperation with Montenegro’s neighbors.
During the NATO bombing campaign in 1999, Djukanovic
blamed Milosevic for provoking the strikes but also called on
NATO to stop the bombing. He repeatedly addressed the

Milo Djukanovic, President of
Montenegro
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Western countries and international financial institutions for aid
and investment, which yet was slow to come partly because of
the blockade on Yugoslavia, partly because of unclear status of
relations between Montenegro and Serbia. Internationally, the
federation of Montenegro with Serbia is not recognized by the
United States and many others, Russia and Cuba being among
the few exceptions. 7
Since 1999 the idea of a referendum on independence has
become

increasingly

attractive

to

many

Montenegrins.

Djukanovic uses it as a leverage against Milosevic in order to
obtain a “Redefinition of relations with FRY”, which in fact
would mean the maintenance of loose political affiliation with
Belgrade and at the same time an opportunity to enact
independent economic policies and qualify for western aid and
investment. So far Milosevic has worked against this proposal by
sponsoring pro-Serbian parties and increasing the Yugoslav
army presence in the region. The utility of the Yugoslav army,
according to Belgrade professor Vojin Dimitrievic, is greatly
enhanced by the fact that it is the only federal institution that
still functions in this fractured nation. 8
The Liberal Alliance (LSCG) headed by Slavko Perovic,
the most active promoter of independence, has however stayed
aside from the governing coalition. Its supporters argue that
Montenegro,

as

an

independent

nation

was

abusively

incorporated into Yugoslav kingdom and the Montenegrin
Autocephalous Church was subordinated by force to the Serbian
Orthodox Church in 1920. Surviving in exile, for instance in
Detroit, USA, the Montenegrin Autocephalic Orthodox Church
was reactivate d in Cetinje in 1993. In the same year Dr. Vojslav
Nikcevic published a book suggesting that “Montenegrins speak
and write Montenegrin”, different from Croatian or Serbian.
Today independence is actively supported by the Montenegrin
Diaspora, scattered around North America and Europe, which
plan to hold their Second World Congress in August, 2000 in the

7

The US view is that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) has dissolved
and that none of the successor republics represents its continuation. Source: CIA Home
Page.
8
Interview, Graz, July 1, 2000.
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old Montenegrin capital of Cetinje under the patronage of
President Milo Djukanovic.
Summing up, on the issue of independence, Djukanovic
can rely on his voters, the radical nationalists from LSCG, the
support of the Diaspora, the Montenegrin Autocephalous
Church and the 20,000 strong Montenegrin police as well as
many Albanians and Muslims antagonized by Milosevic’s
behavior during the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.
On the other side there are the supporters of maintaining
Montenegro as a part of Yugoslavia. Their leader, Momir
Bulatovic, the former president of Montenegro, is backed by
Milosevic, himself a Montenegrin, loyal Serbs and Montenegrins
as well as the 10.000 strong Yugoslav army and 1.000 pro-Serb
paramilitaries. Recently the Second Yugoslav Army located in
the republic was reinforced by 240 Kosovo hard-liners replacing
officers of Montenegrin origins.
Momir Bulatovic’s Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro
(SNP) is the strongest single party in the country and has
established an electoral coalition known as “Yugoslavia – SNP –
Momir Bulatovic.” The coalition is an attempt to unite the proYugoslav forces in the republic and is specificall y addressed to
two small Serb-nationalist parties: Serb Radical Party (SRS) and
Serb People’s party (SNS), which so far failed to gain
representation in the parliament. However, conversations with
various members of these parties indicate that the coalition will
not be easily maintained since the SRS does not recognize
Montenegro as a state or as a Montenegrin nation. This view,
they acknowledge, is rather unpopular in Montenegro.
Historically, besides Serbia, Yugoslavian patriotism has
found a more fertile ground in Montenegro, which saw itself as
the lighthouse of the southern Slavic independence. The
Montenegrins were ferocious fighters in the World War II
resistance movement, they had a disproportionately

high

percentage of members in the Yugoslav communist party, and
they were always over-represented on the federal level. Many
Montenegrins will comment that they always went to Serbia to
go to school and to assume authority. In addition, there is a large
population in Serbia of Montenegrin origins, while at the same
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time there is a large community of Serbs and Serb refugees in
Montenegro itself. Just several years ago Montenegrins fought
along with Serbs for Yugoslav unity in Dubrovnik.
In addition to ideology and politics, the economy plays
an important

role

in the development

of this

region.

Montenegro, along with Macedonia and Kosovo, was one of the
poorest republics of Yugoslavia. However, it was the Yugoslav
central planning that allowed Montenegro to jump from a
backward feudal society into industri alization and urbanization
and also become a tourist paradise in summer. Since the
beginning of the recent crisis in Yugoslavia the heavy industry
has been dragging and the only revenues are provided by
Serbian tourists, and, increasingly, by smuggling. Montenegrin
government sources acknowledge that years of sanctions have
fueled the black economy and the smuggling of cigarettes into
Rome, which is costing Italy millions in tax revenues. 9 Indeed,
many speed boats anchored in Kotor Bay belong to veteran
smugglers who earned their fortunes in the Bosnian war when a
liter of gasoline smuggled by Albanians over Skadar lake could
be sold to Bosnian Serbs for a fivefold price.
While the living standards dropped by more then 50%,
“the only thing that Montenegrin authorities have been doing
efficiently for all these ten years is controlling the national
economic

resources

and

their

distribution

among

the

nomenclatura pyramid members,” argue local experts. 10 The
recent “monetary divorce” between the two republics, with
Montenegro resorting to the DM as its second currency,
highlighted the deterioration in their relations. Serbia has
retaliated by closing its markets to Montenegrin exporters and
denying Montenegro subsidized food that keeps ordinary Serbs
from starving.
Traditionally, the Montenegrin coast was the summer
destination for the inhabitants of the Yugoslav capital Belgrade
with thousands of them flooding through Tivat airport to
elegant Venetian-style city-ports of Budva, Kotor, Perast or
9

“Italy’s Mafia obsession aids Milosevic -Montenegro”, December 28, Brussels, (Reuters)
by montenegro.com.
10
Weekly political report, May 11, 2000 by montenegro.com
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numerous villas overlooking the sea. Today these people worry
that they might have to sell their holiday properties again, as
they did in Croatia. Even without the possible disruption of a
move for Montenegrin independence, the prices for food and
basic services on the coast are so high that they cannot be met by
scarce wages back in Serbia.
Today, Montenegrins insist that the West must subsidize
Montenegro until Milosevic leaves power. While they express
gratitude that the United States has committed $55 million in
technical assistance, budget support and humanitarian aid for
Montenegro in 2000 and plans a similar commitment in 2001,
they maintain that more is necessary. Some disappointment has
been expressed at the reaction of other international actors who
have responded to Montenegro’s crisis. While the European
Union announced that it would double its aid to Montenegro
from 10 to 20 million Euro this year, the World Bank president
James Wolfenson stated that he “was under legal obligation not
to act in Montenegro because it was not a member of the bank. 11
Many Montenegrin officials privately concede that they are
forced to place greater reliance on individual countries, such as
Germany, which have played a more consistent role in
providing investment guarantees for companies prepared to
invest in Montenegro.
In the spring of 2000, Montenegro found itself in what
local observers refer to as “the shade of a volcano.” The drive for
independence and the counter-drive slowly polarized the
society. If in February 1998 the majority of Montenegrins were
still favoring the federation, then by September 1999 the relative
majority had switched to independence and this trend was on
the increase this year. The local elections in Podgorica and
Herzeg-Novi, held on June 11, were seen as the test for support
for both rival camps in Montenegro. “During the oncoming
elections the citizens will be in fear of a monetary strike by
Belgrade,

Yugoslav

liberals”, said a local
11

Army
analyst. 12

seventh

battalion,

Montenegro

According to Srdjan Darmanovi c,

“EU urges more international support for Montenegro”, posted March 29, 2000 by
montenegro.com.
12
“Weekly political report”, May 11, 2000 by montenegro.com
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a local political analyst, the elections indicated that there is a
slow but firm trend in favor of Djukanovic government while
strengthening his party’s position in the capital in spite of losing
some voters in Herzeg-Novi.” 13 Indeed, Podgorica, the country’s
capital, accounts for one forth of the total electorate while
Herzeg-Novi, a small town on the Bosnian border, is also home
for some 5,000 Yugoslav refugees. “The European and American
assistance,

provided

to

Podgorica,

not

to

Herzeg-Novi,

undoubtedl y helped Djukanovic’s turnout, since every local vote
here has larger political connotation,” added Darmanovic.
Table 1. Preferred status of Montenegro

14

Federation

Independence

Confederation

February 1998.

51.7 %

21.0 %

10.5 %

May 1999.

38.8 %

28.9 %

20.5 %

September 1999.

27.6 %

32.3 %

19.6 %

January 2000.

28.0 %

36.1 %

22.5 %

President Milo Djukanovic has threatened to call a
referendum on the question of independence in the near future.
“So, this spring or a bit later the referendum will happen,”
Djukanovic declared on the 4th of April. “Serbia is sinking deeper
and deeper, its debts are accumulating, it has imposed a
blockade on Montenegro, and is playing various tricks.”

15

“A

referendum offering a straight choice between Yugoslavia and
independe nce could probably be won now,” experts of the
International Crisis Group have stated. 16 The opinion polls show
a constant increase in support for independence. In July 2000,
surveys indicated that 39.7% of Montenegrins were in favor of
separation of Montenegro from Yugoslavia. 17
On the other side, there are fears of a forced removal
from office of Montenegro’s pro-independence president. US

13

Interview, Perast, July 20, 2000
“Public Opinion in Crna Gora”, CEDEM, Podgorica, April 2000.
“Montenegro might hold independence referendum within months: minister”, April 4,
2000 by montenegro.com
16
“Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano”, March 21, 2000, ICG Home Page
17
“Za i protiv otcepljenja Crne Gore od Jugoslavije”, Blic Montenegro, July 20, 2000
14
15
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Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has repeatedly warned
Milosevic that “any change by force of political situation of
Montenegro will be sanctioned.” NATO’s European former
military leader Wesley Clark told a news conference that Serbia
is clearly preparing for possible military action against prowestern Montenegro. Clark declined to comment on any military
preparatio ns NATO may have made in this respect, but clearly
warned Milosevic not to interfere. 18 Both officials and the
average citizens express great concern about the role of a 1,000
member paramilitary force created by the Serbian government
and recently stationed in Montenegro. For them, such a
development is an ominous accompaniment to the already
threatening role of the 10,000- man Yugoslav Second Army that
has taken over Montenegrin airports and set up pro-Serbian
television stations on its Montenegrin bases. Montenegrin
officials complain, both in private as well as in public, that the
Serbs are taking these actions in an effort to provoke President
Djukanovic into overreacting in a manner that will bring about
popular support in Serbia for a military

move against

Montenegro.
In the meantime Milosevic is attempting to exercise his
final instrument of leverage against Montenegro. In July 2000,
the federal assembly, disregarding the opposition, passed
amendments to the constitution of Yugoslavia, paving the way
for a new mandate to Milosevic. In response Filip Vujanovic, the
Chairman of Montenegrin Parliament, announced that the
government

coalition of Montenegro

will boycott federal

elections due in the fall, saying that “Montenegro will not
participate in any elections that would mean the ruling of
Slovodan Milosevic.” 19 On August 25, in an effort to limit local
participation in the elections, the Montegrin government banned
state media coverage of the election campaign. This ban covered
all 16 of Montenegro’s public television and radio stations. Many
analysts in Montegro warn of possible strikes on Montenegro
after the conclusion of the elections.
18

NATO sees threat to Montenegro, warns Serbia, Lisbon, posted on March 29 (Reuters)
posted on montenegro.com.
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Western support for Djukanovic was partly predicated
on the judgement that, in the absence of credible opposition in
Serbia, he constituted the only serious opposition to Milosevic in
the Yugoslav

context aiming at making Djukanovic

the

figurehead for all the opposition to Milosevic. 20 However, while
last year the Western powers have urged Montenegro not to try
to secede from Yugoslavia but to join Serbian opposition to
confront Milosevic and work for democracy “from within,” now
the option of independence might be the only one feasible. 21 A
new attempt to unite Serbian opposition under one banner failed
again this July in Svety-Stefan, a Montenegrin resort. In speaking
with Octavian Sofransky, many people from Podgorica, Belgrade
and Zagreb expressed
enduring

political

their conviction

crisis

is

beyond

the

that Yugoslavia’s
control

of

the

“democratic” forces. For these individuals, the only answer is
one that would

come from within

Milosevic’s

political

entourage.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata
said she did not see Montenegro becoming the next Balkan flash
point. However the UNHCR was building up emergency
facilities in the region, though she was cautiously optimistic the
tense situation would not escalate like Kosovo last year. 22 The
international crisis group has called for a slow internalization of
Montenegro through infiltration of NGOs and other initiatives.
EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy
Javier Solana agreed that Montenegro should stay within the
Yugoslav federation but with closer contacts with other nation in
the

region. 23

Meanwhile

in

Podgorica,

President

Milo

Djukanovic said that Bodo Hombach, who heads EU's Balkan
Stability Pact, recently promised him that Montenegro will

19

“The governing coalition will boycott federal elections”, Pobjeda, Podgorica,
July 23, 2000
20
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21
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22
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23
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attend the pact's meeting in Thessaloniki in July as a full
participant. 24
The more radical members of this camp declared that
“the

Serb

preparations

for

violent

intervention

against

Montenegro’s President Milo Djukanovic are clear and present…
Staying out of Montenegro will be impossible… Balkan stability
and Yugoslavia’s existence are in direct contradiction… Three
more viable states – independent Montenegro and Kosovo, plus
a democratic Serbia – may be the most stable outcome… To end
Balkan instability requires far more than bombing from 15,000
feet and peace-enforcement. It may, ultimately, require military
force to ensure the dismemberment of Yugoslav remnants.” 25

24
25

RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 4, No. 99, Part II, 23 May 2000.
“For Balkan peace, final split needed”, May 11, 2000 by montenegro.com
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RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE BALKANS

W

hile Serbia has long been the dominant influence on
Montenegrin

affairs,

Russia

has also

played

an

important role in this region. In spite of increased international
attention, until recently, Russia has kept quiet on Montenegro. 26
Since the peace in Kosovo, Russian political establishment was
too busy with internal matters, such as the election of the new
president and the “antiterrorist campaign” in Chechnya, to
follow-up on Yugoslav developments.

The newly elected

Russian president Vladimir Putin prioritized the revitalization of
the system of vertical power inside Russia, while most foreign
policy objectives have been postponed. In a recent speech, the
foreign Minister Ivanov has described as priorities of the Russian
foreign policy the strategic balance with NATO and major superpowers and the “near-abroad” CIS states as its sphere of
strategic interest. 27
A long-time Montenegrin ally, Russia’s contemporary
concerns are very different from those it had during the RussianTurkish wars when Montenegrin Admiral Mateja Zmajevic
fought under the Russian flag, and the naval school in Perast, an
ancient Montenegrin port, was training Russian marines. If
anything reminds one of Russia in Montenegro today, it is the
portraits of Russian emperors in historical museums and the
icons donated to the Montenegrin Orthodox churches by their
Russian protectors a long time ago. “Our relations with Russia
pertain to the past” – say many Montenegrins. However one can
spot symbols of the new Russia in Montenegro as well. The
vanguard of Russia’s oil exporters Luk Oil has made its presence
felt in the country and a new air route has opened this year
connecting Podgorica and Moscow. Russians seems to be
interested in acquiring property on the sunny Adriatic coast,

26

A search of the archives of major Russian newspapers shows literally nothing on
Montenegro.
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bearing in mind that this is a visa free country, while
Montenegrin businessmen, in turn, are eager to open the
immense Russian market for their goods. On the diplomatic side,
the

Montenegrin

authorities,

following

their

goal

for

international recognition have set-up a “representation” in
Moscow and in exchange, a Russian consulate opened in
Podgorica.
If Montenegro has any importance for Russia today, it
will be derived from the larger Russian games in the region,
especially its “protection” of Belgrade on one side and relations
with NATO on the other. As an example, the controversial
“humanitarian” convoy that was stopped by Hungarian officials
from reaching Yugoslavia in April 1999 had announced its
destination as Montenegro.
One can say that the Balkan policy of the Russian
Federation has entered a new phase. During the 19th century in
an attempt to gain the access to Mediterranean, the Russian
Empire dressed itself as a savior of Balkan, particularly Slavic
nations, sponsoring the independence

movements

of the

Montenegrins, Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks. Soviet Russia, after
winning World War II, attempted to control the entire Balkans
ideologically. The current Russian Federation has adopted the
role of a distant observer from its bases in eastern Moldova and
Sevastopol on the Black Sea. Since NATO made it clear that it
regards Southeastern Europe as a zone of its strategic interest,
Russia, after signing a Russia-NATO charter, has tried to avoid a
direct confrontation with NATO, while occasionally testing the
waters or attempting to bargain for some advantages.
If Russia has tempered its Balkan aspirations for the
moment, then some countries in the region continue to nurture
warm feelings towards their former ally. This is true for Bulgaria
and especially for the politically and economically isolated
Serbia. In a desperate attempt to receive badly needed external
support during the height of the Kosovo crisis, Milosevic has
appealed to Russia as a “traditional ally,” with the request to
admit Serbia into the Russia - Belarus Union. Setting aside the
geographic unfeasibility of the project, Serbia being isolated
from Russia by EU and NATO candidates, the current Union
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itself is hardly functioning economically or politically . In Russia
an opinion poll has revealed that only 28% of the public favor
the Union while 69% are against. 28 It is seen with reservation in
Moscow, as an economic burden and a political embarrassment,
due

primarily

to

President

Lukashenko’s

notoriously

undemocratic rule in Belarus. The rationale of Union survival
lies in the geo-strategic realm, namely Moscow’s fear of NATO
reaching Russian frontiers. Milosevic’s appeal generated little
support among the Kremlin leadership, thus demonstrating the
Russia+Belarus+Yugoslavia=???
(Komsomolskaya Pravda, April 1999)

limited geo-strategic significance of Yugoslavia for Russia today.
Instead, Moscow’s reaction to the Kosovo crises focused on a
diplomatic effort to get a stake in the post-conflict arrangement
and on military maneuvering to test the cohesion of NATO
forces. At home, anti-NATO campaigns have found fertile
ground among Russian nationalists, but debates about the cost
of peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia indicated that
other concerns were driving Russian politics. The Yugoslav
ambassador to Moscow, Borislav Milosevic, in an interview
given to the weekly “Vek,” acknowledged that the idea of joining
the Russia-Belarus Union had been discussed in Belgrade before
the bombing, and on March 24, 2000, the Yugoslav parliament
requested observer status in the Union. Yet he had to confess
that the idea of the Union is opposed by both the Yugoslav
opposition and Montenegro. 29 The appeal was followed by
Milosevic’s petition to the presidents of Russia and Belarus in
which he declared that “Yugoslavia is ready to join the Union.”
Among

his

arguments

were

economic

complementarity,

“multiculturalism,” the common Orthodox religion and Islam as
the second largest religion in the country. What was this if not a
vaguely camouflaged reference to the Russian experience in
“deterri ng Islamic extremism” in Chechnya?
Though Yugoslavia as a whole might have supported
Milosevic’s move to an alliance with Russia, in Montenegro
things are seen differently. A recent opinion poll shows that only
16% of ethnic Montenegrins in the republic support adherence to
28

Moscow News opinion polls, 15-22.04.1999, MN Home Page.
SOLOVIEV Vladimir, “Belgrade longing for an Union”, Vek weekly, No. 8, March 25-03,
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Russia-Belarus Union compared to 53% of ethnic Serbs. The
same source indicates that both Serbs (65%) and Montenegrins
(87%) support the eventual accession of Montenegro to the
European Union. 30
The idea of aligning with Russia is not new in
Yugoslavia. Vojslav Sesel, the leader of the Serbian Radical
Party, voiced it first back in 1993, but no one took it seriously at
that time. It is not surprising, however, that it was resurrected in
1999 under the imminence of NATO bombing. Russia and
Yugoslavia have signed an agreement on military cooperation,
but it was suspended because of the UN embargo, and Belgrade
made a new attempt to involve Russia on its side.
In an article published in Komsomolskaya Pravda on April
14, 1999, the editorialists strike the direct question: “Will a new
treaty imply an obligation of military assistance to Yugoslavia?
Will this help with solving the conflict? Will this involve the
Russian nuclear potential and will Russia be dragged into a
Balkan conflict? Do we need a base on the Adriatic?” The
authors themselves concluded that “the status of a country not
involved in the conflict is more ponderous on the international
arena than a suicidal intervention, and therefore Russia should
limit itself to peaceful means of intervention.” 31
The Russian political scene had an unequal reaction on
the Yugoslav initiative. Constantin Zatulin, leader of the
“Derzava” movement, said that rather than signing-up for a sure
defeat,

Russia

should

increase

assistance

to Yugoslavia,

especially through deliveries of military equipment. Alexei
Mitrofanov from the ultra-nationalist LDPR (Zhirinovski’s party)
argued for accepting Yugoslavia into the Union and bringing the
country under the Russian nuclear umbrella, an act that, in his
opinion, will guarantee the end of the conflict and resurrect the
legendary Russian might. Elena Zazulina from the reformist
“Yabloko” block insisted that an Union can be debated only after
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“Public Opinion in Crna Gora”, CEDEM, Podgorica, April 2000.
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the end of military conflict, and pointed to a referendum as the
only legitimate means. 32
Russian

hawks

trumpeted

the

issue

of

military

involvement throughout the conflict. In an interview with a
popular Russian daily, Sergei Govoruhin, complained that
“today no one takes Russia into account” and “NATO freely
demonstrated its superiority during the rocket-aerial voyage in
Yugoslavia.” He urged that the only way to stop the war is by
delivering to Yugoslavia modern air-defense systems: “ten
mobile C-300 units can fully control the Yugoslav air” and the
threat of a direct Russia NATO confrontation is not higher then
in Vietnam or Afghanistan. 33
At the beginning of the Kosovo bombing in March 1999,
the custom officers of Baku airport in Azerbaidjan impounded
the Russian-made transport plane “Ruslan” with 5 jet fighters on
board. According to accompanying documents, the cargo was to
be transported from Kazakhstan to Slovenia; other sources,
however, indicated its actual destination as Belgrade. 34
On April 2, 1999 Russian military leaders made known
that they intended to send to the Adriatic an expeditionary
Russian fleet composed of 7 vessels: two destroyers, two guard
vessels, a transport and an intelligence ship headed by the
cruiser “Admiral Golovko.” 35 In the end however, only one
Russian military ship—the Sevastopol based “Liman,” an
hydrologist —reached Montenegrin waters some two weeks
later.
In spite of the calls of the hard-liners and attempts to
blackmail NATO, more realistic views have predominated
among Russian military and political establishments. The former
Russian defense minister, Igor Rodionov, put it this way:
“Russia has to give up its Soviet-time ambitions…. It should by
no means accept to be dragged into a military conflict with
NATO, and should focus on the internal political, economical
and social problems particular ly on avoiding a civil war, and

32
33
34
35

“Two questions to politicians”, Komsomolskaya Pravda, April 14, 1999.
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thus escaping NATO “help” to Russia itself on the Yugoslav
model.” 36
Nonetheless, during the entire Kosovo war, Russia
actively supported Yugoslavia with intelligence information.
The

Russian

General

Staff

was

closely

following

the

development of the Yugoslav situation using the land-radars
and space-based systems of observation. NATO commanders
accused Russia of supplying the General command of the
Yugoslav army with intelligence data, accusations that Russia
never

denounced . Instead

the Russian

military

proudly

acknowledged that its suggestions helped Yugoslav army to
avoid substantial human losses, especially for the 40,000 strong
Serbian army in Kosovo. Other useful advice, claimed by
Russian intelligence, was telling the Yugoslavs not to disclose
their entire air-defense system with the beginning of air raids;
this tactic came as a surprise for NATO planners. 37
Trying to get international leverage and cement the
fragmented Russian voters against an external threat on the eve
of new presidential elections, the Moscow power holders
attacked NATO threatening it with “strong pressure inside
Russia for sending volunteers to the conflict, large deliveries of
arms and including Yugoslavia in the Russia-Belarus union. 38
However, in spite of an ample anti-NATO campaign,
Russian public opinion never favored at large military support
for the rump Yugoslavia. If in October 1998, when 44% of
Russian respondents in an opinion poll favored the action
against 53%, then in April 1999, at the height of NATO strikes,
only 36% were in favor, with 61% being against. And even if a
larger percentage declared its readiness to go to fight as
volunteers in Yugoslavia –67% against 27%–, there has been no
confirmation of organized Russian military groups fighting on
the Serbian side. 39 Nor could any Russian volunteer face a
NATO pilot flying at 30,000 feet.
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Vasili Axenov, a well known Russian intellectual,
portrayed Russia as being in a double-sided situation: “One
hand protesting, stretched in a fist, the other begging the West
with humiliation.” 40 He condemned the ambitions of the Russian
leadership and the “wave of hysterical anti-Americanism” and
called upon Russia to act as a mediator.
There is a long history of mediation in this region and the
results of the process are well known. First, upon arriving in
Belgrade on March 30, 1999, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny
Primakov, accompanied by Defense Minister Sergheev and
Foreign Minister Ivanov, proclaimed his intention to “attempt a
political solution … by enabling Yugoslavia to defend its rights
on the international scene.” 41 Belarus President Lukashenko, in a
visit following that of the Russian delegation, voiced his support
for the “Primakov’s initiative” in a show of solidarity. Over the
next two weeks the Russian ambassador in Belgrade, Yuri
Kotov, arranged numerous visits by Russian representatives
including the President of the Russian Duma, Gennady
Seleznyov, the Russian Patriarch Alexi II and others. He also
presided over the repatriation of Russian citizens, about one
thousand of whom left Yugoslavia
campaign. 42

during the bombing

On April 22, a new Russian mediator, Victor

Chernomyrdin, arrived to the region. Chernomyrdin, a former
Prime Minister as well as a special representative of President
Yeltsin, proclaimed that his mission was ”to convince USA and
NATO to stop bombing of Yugoslavia, and the leadership of this
country – to soften its position and relaunch the talks”. 43
In spite of this energetic campaign, Russian diplomacy has
neither succeeded in proposing effective solutions for the crisis
nor in securing a firm place for Russia in the post-conflict
arrangement. Moscow’s diplomats demanded a separate zone of
control for Russian peacekeepers, but NATO, fearing a de-facto
partition of Kosovo much like the post-World War II partition of
40
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Germany, refused to accept their claim. Feeling its honor at
stake, the Russian military command ordered its troops to
occupy the Pristina airport several hours before NATO, using a
part of its peacekeeping force stationed in Bosnia. This militarypolitical trump was short lived, however, as the Russian
contingent in Kosovo was forced to accept a NATO command,
as it did in Bosnia.
According to “Intellectual Capital”, this maneuver was
planned in the utmost secrecy

by the Russian Supreme

Commander, President Yeltsin. The NATO generals were not the
only ones taken by surprise when the Russians paratroopers
arrived. It was only after receiving presidential approval that the
Chief of Russian General Staff, Anatoliy Kvashnin, informed his
nominal boss, the Russian Defense Minister Sergheev. Neither
Prime-Minister Sergheev, nor Chief Intelligence Officer Vladimir
Putin knew about the daring plan. 44 Another strategic ploy, use
of the Pristina airport for a large deploymen t of Russian troops,
was proven futile when Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria
refused to open their air space to Russian military planes. The
Russian reaction, predictably, was negative.
In addition, the Russians faced two real challenges: the
lack of trained modern peace-keeping units and the financial
costs of peace-keeping.

According

to Alexandr

Golz in

“Intellectual Capital” “Moscow’s plan to control an entire sector
in Kosovo required at least 10,000 troops while the maximum
that the Army was able to provide was only 3,600 because the
rest needed training and equipment that could not be ready in
time”. 45 The second issue was a financial one. Russia’s
preference for a United Nations mandate was dictated by
financial

concerns.

The

NATO

framework

obliges

each

participating country to honor its bill and Russia would have
had to dispense no less than $150 million a year. The Bosnian
battalion is already taking half of the 440 million ruble annual
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budget for peacekeeping operations as approved by the Russian
Duma.
During the entire course of the Yugoslav crisis, Russian
policy on Balkans was spontaneous, reactive and highly
contextual. The major crises, like the ones in Bosnia and Kosovo,
brought

sudden

media,

diplomatic,

and

even

military

reverberations in Moscow. When these crises were past, the
issue was forgotten and new issues and priorities appeared: a
new president, a new executive power, and regional reform.
However, one should not underestimate the unpredictability of
Russian policy and the Russian capacity to offer surprises such
as the one in Kosovo. According to Margaret Blunden of the
University of Westminster, “NATO’s avoidance of the UN
Security Council was a test of Russian strength, showing that
there is little Russia can do in the Balkans. Russians, who
opposed bombing watched it and were completely powerless
and inactive. However, such blatant disregard of a former
superpower may and will backfire, as in the case of Chechnya”. 46
By examining Russian behavior in previous Yugoslav
conflicts one may first predict possible Russian reactions in the
event of a greater Montenegrin crises and, second, formulate a
policy that will prevent Russia from working against the
interests of the international community. Generally, the Balkan
region, including Yugoslavia, is not a high priority for the
Russian Federation. Therefore, one may conclude that Russia
will neither support the Montenegrin independence movement
nor do much to save the remnants of the Yugoslav Federation.
The most Russia can do is to offer a dethroned Milosevic
political asylum and use him as a symbol of resistance to NATO
expansion. Yet, as a signatory of International Human Rights
conventions, Russia will find it embarrassing to hide a convicted
war criminal.
For the time being, Russia will continue to supply
Milosevic with military intelligence but there is little chance that
he will provide Serbia with the latest weapon systems. However,
in a case of a protracted civil war, Russian volunteers, armed
46
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with light Russian military equipment, might enter Montenegrin
territory. Their role would likely mirror that of the several
hundred Russian volunteers who journeyed to Serbia during the
NATO bombing campaign in 1999.
Should NATO forces threaten a new attack on Serbia,
Russia would probably resume its diplomatic efforts to prevent
military intervention while also offering its services as a
mediator in the conflict. If intervention takes place, Russia
would undoubtedly demand a zone of control and, if refused, it
might once again use the Pristina airport as a landing zone. In
Montenegro Russia could rely on popular support of the large
pro-Serbian community.
One question that remains unanswered is how enduring
is Moscow’s support for Milosevic. A parallel between Russia
and Yugoslavia reveals a large degree of commonalties but there
are also fundamental differences. Both were multinational
federations that disintegrated after the end of the era of Cold
War confrontation. Both were headed by former aparatchiks
who governed in an authoritarian manner. Both attempted to
preserve an influence over the former satellites through military
means. However, while nuclear Russia has encountered little
opposition in asserting itself, the much weaker Yugoslavia has
stumbled into a suicidal confrontation with the West. While
Yeltsin and Milosevic spoke the same basic language and thus
cemented their alliance during the last decade, Putin, who sees
himself as a modernizer, might decide to use a different
vocabulary. Hoping for a new language of political discourse, a
delegation of Serbian opposition forces went to Moscow to
demand an end to Russia’s unconditional backing of the
Milosovic regime. 47 Eventually, Russia will have to abandon its
support for the authoritarian Balkan regime and look for new
allies in a post-Cold War Southeastern Europe. Given the long
history of mutual éntente, Montenegro might well become one of
Russia’s new partners.
At the July 2000, G-8 summit in Okinawa, Russian
President Putin and US President Clinton reportedly discussed
47
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Montenegro and this most recent Balkan crisis. They stressed
“the importance of democratic government in Montenegro and
its President Djukanovic”. 48 Many political observers in Eastern
Europe—from Montenegro to Moldova —have seen in that a
promise of a decline in the long-standing unconditional Russian
support for Milosevic.

48
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MULTILATERAL IMPLICATIONS OF
MONTENEGRIN INDEPENDENCE

“A

unilateral

declaration

of

independence

by

Montenegro will bring civil war”: this is said by

everyone in the Balkans. Milosevic would be happy to open a
new offensive to extend his “legitimization” as the defender of
the

Yugoslavian

motherland

in

defiance

Montenegrins

who

of
do

“American

imperialism”.

Many

not

want

independence,

pledging allegiance to Greater Serbia, will

support him. The community of Serbian refugees from Kosovo
and Bosnia, some 32,000-strong in Montenegro, will also oppose
secession. Finally, most East Europeans simply do not believe
that anyone can defeat the Yugoslav army, always loyal to
Milosevic, on the ground in the Balkans.
Montenegrins, though renowned as tough fighters, have
never

taken

up

arms

against

the Serbs.

In numerous

conversations, they made this point to Octavian Sofransky
during his visit to the region. “Going ahead with the referendum
on independence for Montenegro would risk radicalizing a
population still peacefully divided over the issue, and would
offer maximum provocation to Belgrade, which retains a
powerful

military

presence in Montenegro”. 49 An armed

struggle would highlight the status of hundreds of thousands of
Montenegrins living in Serbia. Unlike Kosovo, where Albanians
had a large majority, which increased after the Serbs fled, or
Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Serbs have obtained a territorial
autonomy, Montenegro has no other division, than political,
between the nationalist Greens and unionist Whites.
During his visit to Montenegro in July, Sofransky
observed that there is a very complex mosaic of allegiances, a
multi-layered political process, and a grotesque historical
49
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heritage that render the apparent Green and White palette
extremely nuanced. Indeed, Montenegrin society seems to be
made up of opposites: there are two parallel currencies —the
Yugoslav Dinar and the German mark; two churches—the
Serbian Patriarchate and the Montenegrin one, even two
capitals—the capital city Cetinje and the main city Podgorica.
Some people claim they speak Serbian, some affirm that they
speak Montengrin, some use the Latin, some the Cyrilic
alphabet. Almost half want an independent Montenegro while
the other half prefers a common state with the Serbians.
However,

there

is

no

one

clear

boundary

within

the

Montenegrin society, since these predilections overlap and
extend well beyond Montenegro into neighboring Serbia where
the business class uses the Latin alphabet and the German mark
as well. Montenegrins have conformed to duality and prefer to
live with it rather taking one final decision.
A negotiated settlement, leading to a non-violent
independence for Montenegro implies an agreement from
Belgrade. Prospects for this look grim, however, as long as this
independence is perceived in Belgrade mainly as an anti-Serbian
and anti-Milosevic conspiracy of the West. Since the political
and economic pressure applied on Belgrade did not function
MIEL, The Straights Time, Singapore

before, in case of non-Serbian territories like Bosnia or Kosovo, it
is even less probable than they might function today in
Montenegro —“a symbol of Serbian civilization.” However, by
now

Montenegro

and

Serbia

are

already

in

de

facto

confederational relations and are learning to accept a parallel
existence. What could not be done during the violent collapse of
Yugoslavia, namely a “velvet divorce,” might be the ultimate
result.
A quick multinational intervention is the third way to
attain independence. Obviously the only party who can provide
security guarantees for an independent Montenegro is NATO. A
military campaign, provoked by Milosevic’s brutal interference
in Montenegro’s affairs, would require a massive presence of
ground troops to deter guerrilla fighters. NATO countries,
however, might find it difficult to attract domestic support both
for a ground intervention, as for a new aerial strike on Serbia,
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since Milosevic’s interference in Montenegro could be portrayed
neither as ethnic cleansing nor as genocide. Even if a NATO led
force should be deployed in the independence -minded republic,
how much time would be needed until the peacekeepers could
leave?
Ultimately, the issue of the partition of Montenegro can
be resurrected. The northern districts of the country are
traditionally pro-Serbian. Moreover, several parts of today’s
Montenegro, such as the bay of Kotor in the south and part of
Sandjak in the north, were granted to the republic by Tito and
were never part of Montenegro before.
The status of an independent Montenegro and its
political system is another unanswered question. Montenegro is
a multinational country, less than two-thirds of its population
describes

itself

as

Montenegrin.

One

can

envision

the

Macedonian scenario, with the development of a Montenegrin
civic identity that would be embraced by other ethnic groups. It
will take many decades, however, for a Serb to call himself a
Montenegrin.
Today, the symbols of Montenegrin statehood are the
omnipresent policemen in blue uniforms and the famous urban
complex Vector of Podgorica: built by private money it hosts
several ministries as well as apartments for government
employees. A retired Montenegrin minister spoke about the
need for more uplifting national symbols and admitted that the
local political establishment, once deprived of the figure of a
defiant Milosevic, resembles an oligarchic regime with no
rationale for its existence. No one, he maintained, knows who
would assume prominence in and take the role of an opposition
in an independent Montenegro. Promoting democracy within
Montenegro should be a central objective whether done in
concert with a drive for independence or acceptance of its status
as part of the Federation. As things stand today, the elements of
democratic politics are absent.
The next issue in contemplating the future of Montenegro
is economic reconstruction. The inclusion of Montenegro into the
Stability Pact framework will provide for critical investment into
infrastructure

but

a long-term

strategy

requires

foreign
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investment and prospects for EU membership . A fervent
supporter of Montenegrin independence told Sofransky that
“once we get independence we should immediately join the
United States.” What he meant, however, was that an
independent Montenegro will have to rely on US security and
economic support and was unable to function as a genuinely
independent nation.
After spending three weeks in Montenegro, talking to
academics, students and politicians, Sofransky’s impression is
that the country is indeed ready for self-governance, has a
certain identity, political institutions and an economic system
enabling it to function parallel to Yugoslavia. However,
Montenegrin society would be devastated by a sudden break. It
is not ready to openly confront the Milosevic regime nor to cope
with internal tensions. The pragmatists in Montenegro have
adopted the gradualist strategy towards greater sovereignty and
this approach seems to work in this Mediterranean culture.
Today many see Montenegro as the key for Balkan peace.
Relieved of its Yugoslav appendix, Serbia might finally focus
inward on the pressing economic problems and opt for
democratization

and

cooperation

with

the

international

community. However, it might also be that Montenegro is a
trigger for a new protracted civil war, a new Vietnam, which will
immerse the future of Balkan people in uncertainty. The
Montenegrins, however, do not think in purely strategic terms
but tend to focus on a much more important, if disruptive,
concept: their honor. With that as the focus for so many, the
prospects for peace in the Balkans will remain clouded in the
uncertainty of a potentially violent post-communist nationalism.
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